The idea is that thinking about one's own current pain already somehow involves pain itself: In a related vein, Chalmers poses an intriguing dilemma to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. As Papineau  points out, by 'mode of presentation' we cannot mean an associated description that we can already think and use to refer to an entity which has those properties the description attributes.
He calls his view Strong Representationalism and it is a view shared by other representationalists like Harman and Tye The authors' perspectives range widely. But then how can consciousness be physical. But then how can consciousness be physical.
If you are dealing with knowing what it's like that consists in a cluster of abilities as is assumed in the second RoboMary thought-experimentfacts are out of the picture and there is no possible threat to physicalism.
Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. This view of phenomenal concepts explains both the conceivability of zombies and the explanatory gap in terms of the directness of these concepts i.
These are physicalist responses to the Knowledge Argument by Dennett, Nemirow, and the recently turned physicalist Jackson himself with the exception of Alter's essay, which argues that Jackson's recent way of answering the argument doesn't work, and Nordby's essay, which looks at the thought-experiment underlying the Knowledge Argument from the point of view of vision science Nordby himself is a color blind color scientist being in a predicament somewhat reminiscent of Jackson's Mary, the protagonist of the Knowledge Argument.
In what follows, I am going to sketch some of these anti-physicalist arguments, so that we can get a clearer idea on what the Phenomenal Concept Strategy needs to accomplish.
The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts--knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts--have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate.
Optional readings are marked with an asterisk. This is very much in line with the traditional understanding of the acquaintance relation. Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts. Dennett wants to persuade us that RoboMary and by extension, presumably, human Mary as well can, based on her scientific knowledge, induce in herself a phenomenal experience of red, and so can know what it's like to see red simply based on her knowledge of the psycho-physics of vision.
Are responses along these lines adequate.
They are limited to how the famous diaphanousness or transparency of experience can best be deployed to make an argument for representationalism, and they are conditional in that I largely assume diaphanousness.
This seminar counts toward the distribution requirement in the area of philosophy of mind; it is not a core seminar. It is possible to see how the story goes, according to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.
On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.
Only if what you learn is possibly a new fact about color experience should the physicalist be worried. Torin Alter seems to have exactly this point in mind in his reply to Jackson in the volume, "Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument. This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: RoboMary and her amazing ploys are not needed here.
Our epistemic situation is fully explicated by these features of phenomenal concepts. If this is right, the crucial premise premise 1 of the anti-physicalist arguments will be undermined and the arguments rendered ineffective.
It only relies on a contrast between the comprehensibility of the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness is non-physical and the incomprehensibility of corresponding hypotheses involving properties figuring in the special sciences, e.
Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. She thinks physicalists should reject the claim that phenomenal concepts require some sort of "presence" of, or "acquaintance" with … the quality denoted, since this claim is backed only by the intuitions that they have already explained away.
For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed.
The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. This seminar will trace out the rise and possible fall. The book is divided into two parts. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: According to this understanding, in introspection we gain insight into the very nature of the property we are introspecting.
Seminar presentations may be given using notes or slides, but they may not be read aloud from a pre-written paper. This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics:.
Introduction to Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (OUP, ). Torin Alter - unknown details This volume presents thirteen new essays on phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: twelve by philosophers and one by a scientist. Introduction to Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (OUP, ).
Torin Alter - unknown Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Introduction to Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (OUP, ). Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Feb 1,Sam Coleman and others published Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism New Essays on.
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Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is izu-onsen-shoheiso.com:Concept consciousness essay knowledge new phenomenal phenomenal physicalism